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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1994) , which grants this 
Court original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from "orders on 
petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons." Walker was originally committed to the Utah 
State Prison on a second-degree felony; therefore, this Court has 
jurisdiction. 
1 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court apply the wrong standard of review to 
Walker's petition for quasi-appellate review of the Board's 
revocation proceeding? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSVE 
Appellants did not know the court was going to use an improper 
standard of review until after the decision; however, appellants 
did inform the court of the proper standard of review in its 
answer, R. 35-62, and in oral argument before the trial court (Tr. 
Hearing before Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki, Walker v. State, Case No. 
930904964, Jan. 15, 1993, at 16). 
STANPARP OF REVIEW 
The choice of a standard of review is a legal conclusion that 
this Court can review for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994); State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 
1991) . 
STATUTES 
All relevant statutes are attached to this brief in Addendum 
A. 
2 
RE07EST FOR ORAL AROVMENT ANP PTOLISBEP OPINION 
The Board requests oral argument and a published opinion 
because neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court have issued 
an opinion that sets out the appropriate standard of review in rule 
65B petitions that challenge a parole revocation hearing. Recent 
cases such as Preece v. House. 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah Nov. 23, 
1994), and Neel v. Holden. Slip Op. No. 930447 (Utah Dec. 7, 1994), 
discussed due process procedures at Board hearings setting a 
release date. This matter deals instead with non-procedural issues 
regarding the deference due Board findings of fact and decisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History-
Walker filed this petition for extraordinary relief after the 
Board of Pardons and Parole revoked his parole on August 3, 1993. 
Walker, initially committed to the prison for robbery, a second-
degree felony, paroled from the prison in July 1989 and was 
subsequently arrested on a charge of aggravated robbery. (R. 8). 
A jury convicted Walker of the offense but the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial because of 
suggestive identification procedures that placed the eyewitness 
3 
t e s t i m o n y i n doubt . (R. 2 1 ; S t a t e v . Walker, Case No. 900545, 
u n p u b l i s h e d o r d e r , June 2 , 1 9 9 2 ) . The c r i m i n a l t r i a l cour t 
s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s m i s s e d t h e c r i m i n a l charge because t h e S t a t e was 
unprepared t o go forward on r e t r i a l . (Walker v . S t a t e . Case No. 
930904964; Tr. Hearing b e f o r e Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki , January 15 , 
1993 , a t 1 1 ) . x 
While the d i r e c t appeal from the aggravated robbery c o n v i c t i o n 
was s t i l l pending, however, Walker p l e d g u i l t y i n December 1990 t o 
t h r e e v i o l a t i o n s of h i s p a r o l e agreement: (1) f a i l u r e t o r e s i d e a t 
h i s l i s t e d a d d r e s s ; (2) hav ing been c o n v i c t e d of aggravated 
robbery; and (3) hav ing been c o n v i c t e d of an h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l 
o f f e n s e . (Tr. Hearing b e f o r e Board of Pardons, In re Thayne 
Walker. February 25 , 1993 , a t 4) . 2 Based on t h o s e g u i l t y p l e a s , 
t h e Board revoked Walker ' s p a r o l e and s c h e d u l e d a p a r o l e grant 
r e h e a r i n g f o r 1999. I d . A f t e r the c r i m i n a l t r i a l court d i s m i s s e d 
Walker ' s c r i m i n a l c a s e on remand from t h e Utah Supreme Court, t h e 
1
 Although this citation i s to a transcript of a hearing in this matter, the 
transcript has not been paginated as part of the record. The transcript i s 
available at the Third District Court. 
2
 Walker attached copies of these transcripts to his petit ion as Exhibits A 
and B. Although the tr ia l court reviewed these transcripts as part of i t s 
decisionmaking process, the transcripts themselves were not paginated as part of 
the court record. They are currently located at the Third District Court. 
4 
Board brought Walker before it on February 25, 1993 on a new 
allegation: having committed the offense of aggravated robbery, 
id. Walker pled not guilty to this charge but he did not change 
his guilty plea to the allegation of having failed to reside at his 
listed address. Id. at 5. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the Board found Walker guilty of 
violating his parole agreement by failing to reside at his address 
of record and by having committed the offense of aggravated 
robbery. (R. 19) . The Board revoked his parole and scheduled a 
rehearing date to determine whether he should be given another 
parole date in the future. Id- Walker then filed this rule 65B 
petition for extraordinary relief in Third District Court, alleging 
that the Board lacked constitutionally sufficient evidence to find 
he had committed aggravated robbery, even by a preponderance of the 
evidence. (R. 9). Walker attached to his rule 65B petition the 
two volumes of transcripts of the Board hearing, but not the 
criminal trial transcript that also was before the Board.2 
Walkerfs counsel at the parole revocation hearing, Mark Stringer, is a 
partner in the same firm as Walker's current counsel, Rose Blakelock. Mr. 
Stringer objected to the Board's use of the criminal trial transcript and 
certainly knew of its significance to the Board's decision. 
5 
After reviewing the incomplete evidence that Walker provided 
as part of the petition, the trial court agreed with Walker!s 
contention that the Board lacked sufficient evidence to find that 
he had committed the offense charged. (R. 91) . Notwithstanding 
that ruling, the trial court upheld the Board's revocation based 
solely on Walker's admission that he had failed to reside at his 
listed address and ordered the Board to reevaluate his parole 
rehearing date without relying on the aggravated robbery charge. 
(R. 91-92) . 
Statement of Facts 
Beginning on February 25, 1993 and continuing on March 22, 
1993, the Board held an evidentiary hearing to decide whether 
Walker committed the offense of aggravated robbery on or about 
August 18, 1989 in Salt Lake County, in violation of condition 
number three of his parole agreement. The Board listened to and 
questioned witnesses, examined documentary evidence, and reviewed 
parts of the criminal trial transcript. Walker introduced into 
evidence a notarized affidavit of one of the State's witnesses at 
the criminal trial, Toni Christensen. 
6 
At trial, Christensen had given testimony damaging to Walker; 
at the Board hearing, Christensen1s affidavit recanted that 
damaging testimony. Because Christensen could not be found and, 
therefore, could not be reached by subpoena, the Board accepted the 
affidavit under exceptions to the hearsay rule. (R. 17). 
Nevertheless, the Board found Christensen1s trial testimony more 
credible and disbelieved the recantation. (R. 18). 
After reviewing the criminal trial transcript and the live 
testimony at the revocation hearing, the Board concluded that 
Walker violated his parole agreement through committing the offense 
of aggravated robbery. Because of concern about the validity of 
the eyewitness identification testimony, the Board specifically 
disregarded that evidence. (R. 16-17). In its Amended Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law, R. 15-19, attached as Addendum C, the 
Board found numerous facts based on the evidence before it: (1) 
two days before the robbery, Walker asked Toni Christensen to get 
him a gun so that he could "make some money"; (2) on that same 
day, Christensen obtained her father's silver-colored revolver and 
gave it to Walker; (3) employees of the Taco Bell described the 
robber as a person who stood between 6f and 6f4" in height, with 
7 
blue eyes with wrinkles around them, light brown or sandy blond 
hair, carrying a silver-colored revolver; (4) it was the practice 
of Taco Bell employees to place loose change in rolls wrapped in 
"Taco Bell" wrappers; (5) the robber drove away in a car identified 
as belonging to Thomas Bridwell, the brother of Walker's 
girlfriend, Linda Rice; (6) Shelly Manwell testified at the trial 
that Walker came to her apartment on August 18, 1989, the day of 
the robbery, carrying a moneybag that contained rolls of coins 
wrapped in plastic with "Taco Bell" on them; (7) Manwell testified 
that he carried a revolver, appeared nervous and upset, and was 
wearing levis and tennis shoes; (8) the Board noted Walker's 
personal appearance, he stands between 6! and 6f4" in height, has 
blue eyes with wrinkles around them, and has light brown hair. 
gPMMARY OF THE ARSPMENT 
The trial court erred because it did not apply the correct 
appellate standard of review. Walker's rule 65B petition actually 
was a request that the trial court carry out an appellate-style 
review of the Board's revocation hearing. Because it was an 
appeal, Walker was obligated to marshal the evidence in support of 
the Board's findings and demonstrate clear error. Not only did 
8 
Walker fail to marshal the evidence but he provided the trial court 
with an incomplete record, ignoring the primary source in support 
of the Boardfs decision: the trial transcript of Walkerfs criminal 
adjudication. 
Due to these failures, the trial court was obliged to accept 
the Boardfs findings and proceed to determine the accuracy of the 
Board's conclusions of law and application of the law to the 
facts. Essentially, this step in the appellate process merely 
required the court to decide if the findings established the 
elements of aggravated robbery by the constitutional burden of 
proof applicable to revocation proceedings: preponderance of the 
evidence. The findings demonstrate that Walker robbed a Taco Bell 
store and used a gun to carry it out. Because these facts 
establish aggravated robbery, the trial court should have accepted 
the Board's revocation decision and denied Walker's rule 65B 
petition. 
ARgUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REVIEWED EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS DE NOVO, REWEI6HIN6 THE EVIDENCE AND 
JUDGING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; THEREFORE, BECAUSE THE 
COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY DEFER TO THE BOARD, ITS JUDGMENT 
MUST BE VACATED. 
9 
In substance, Walker's rule 65B petition requested the trial 
court to conduct appellate review of the Board's revocation 
proceeding. In re Discharge of Jones. 720 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah 
1986); Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil. Gas & Mining. 675 P.2d 
1135, 1139-40 (Utah 1983); Erkman y, civil Service Cpmm'n, 198 p.2d 
238, 240 (Utah 1948); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 
23, 26 (Utah App. 1991); Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Dep't of 
Health. 797 P.2d 438, 443-44 (Utah App. 1990); Davis County v. 
Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704, 711 (Utah App. 1988) ; £££ also Craig 
v. State. 844 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Idaho App. 1992) (appeal of district 
court decision affirming parole commission revocation); In re 
Appeal of Banks. 630 P.2d 1131, 1133-34 (Kan. 1981) (appeal of 
administrative decision not to build health facility). 
Because this case was an appellate proceeding, the trial court 
should have required Walker to marshal the evidence before the 
Board and demonstrate clear error. Norman H. Jackson, 7 Utah Bar 
J. Utah Standards of Appellate Review 9, 13 (1994); Alta Indus. 
Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Utah 1993); Kennecott Corp, y, 
State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993). Not only did 
Walker not marshal the evidence, but the evidence he did supply to 
10 
the district court was incomplete.4 The trial court's resulting 
obligation then to accept the Board's findings of fact as correct 
was required, not just by the marshaling doctrine, Crockett v. 
Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992)(because of failure to 
marshal evidence, appellate court assumes record supports 
findings), but also by "elementary principles of appellate 
review," Sawyers v. Sawyers. 558 P.2d 607, 608 (Utah 1976) (in the 
absence of a record, findings are presumed to have been supported 
by admissible, competent, and substantial evidence). 
Additionally, the trial court erred when it acted as the 
initial factfinder and substituted its judgment for the Board1s. In 
a hearing held to clarify his ruling, Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
expressed his understanding of his authority to review the Boardfs 
decision. 
But when there i s confl ict and contra-affidavit or 
testimony then the court - - then I look as a finder of 
fact and was not persuaded, under the facts and the 
al legations at that time, that there was suff ic ient - -
that i t was suff ic ient enough before the board to make 
the finding that he, in fact , committed the crime of 
The Board's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
demonstrate that the primary evidence in support of the Board's decis ion was the 
criminal t r i a l testimony, not the two days of hearings and a f f idav i t s before the 
i t . Walker's s e l e c t i v e presentat ion of the most favorable evidence does not 
appropriately marshal the evidence. Ona in tern '1 . (U.S.A.) v. m h Ave. Corp.. 
850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993). 
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second degree robbery, fur ther because there was never 
ever any subsequent conviction on tha t case. 
(Tr. Hearing before Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki, Walker v. S ta te . Case 
No. 930904964, January 24, 1994, a t 6-7) . 
This quotation shows two fundamental e r ro r s in the t r i a l 
c o u r t f s approach to t h i s case. F i r s t , as an appel la te court , i t 
should not have reweighed the evidence or re-judged the c r e d i b i l i t y 
of witnesses.5 Second, the t r i a l court misconstrued the law. The 
Board did not need a criminal conviction before i t revoked 
Walker's paro le . Ward v. Smith. 573 P. 2d 781, 782 (Utah 
1977)("[C]riminal a c t i v i t y i s a condition of parole , however, a 
conviction i s not a p re requ is i t e [to revocation] . On the contrary, 
evidence produced at t r i a l which r e s u l t s in a c q u i t t a l may 
never theless be used as a bas i s for parole r evoca t ion . " ) . 
Had the t r i a l court cor rec t ly applied the marshaling doctrine 
and the requirement for a complete record, i t would have been bound 
to the Board's f indings . Crockett/ 836 P.2d a t 820; Sawyer. 558 
5
 The most g lar ing di f ference between the Board's judgment and the 
t r i a l court ' s concerned the testimony and a f f i d a v i t of Toni Christensen. At 
t r i a l , Ms. Christensen gave testimony damaging to Walker. At the Board hearing, 
Walker produced am a f f i d a v i t from Christensen in which she recanted that 
testimony. In i t s amended f indings , the Board s p e c i f i c a l l y d i s c r e d i t s the 
a f f i d a v i t , primarily because Christensen did not personal ly t e s t i f y at the 
hearing and, therefore, was not subject to cross-examination as she had been at 
the t r i a l . (R. 17) . The t r i a l court, however, be l ieved the a f f i d a v i t . (R. 91) . 
12 
P.2d at 608; State v. Nine thousand Ong hundred Ninetv-Nine 
Dollars, United States Currency, 791 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah A P P . 
1990)("Since counsel failed to provide this court with all relevant 
evidence bearing on the issues raised on appeal . . . we can only 
presume that the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence.").6 
Assuming the accuracy of the Board!s findings, as it was obligated 
to do, the trial court should then have reviewed the accuracy of 
Even if Walker had marshaled the evidence, the trial court would have 
been obligated to affirm the findings of fact if they were based on "substantial 
evidence" as that term was defined in Deo't of Admin. Services v. Public Service 
Comm'n. 658 P.2d 601, 609 (Utah 1983). The UAPA "substantial evidence" test is 
not appropriate because the Board is not subject to that Act. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-l(2)(c) (Supp. 1994). In Admin. Services. the Utah Supreme Court held 
that agency findings of fact may not be overturned if supported by "evidence of 
any substance whatever," a standard of great deference that gives less latitude 
for judicial review. Admin. Services, 658 P.2d at 609; see sl&Sl SEMECO v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1172-73 (Durham, J. dissenting)(comparing 
substantial evidence standard in UAPA with standard in Admin. Services). This 
standard of deference also correlates closely with the broad discretion courts 
give the Board in other parole issues, Preece v. House. 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 
12 (Utah Nov. 23, 1994); Lancaster v. Utah Board of Pardons. 869 P.2d 945, 947 
(Utah 1994), and the legislature's prohibition on judicial review of Board 
decisions in Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1994). 
The Supreme Court's decision in Ward v. Smith explicitly adopted a standard 
of broad deference as early as 1977: 
The extent of judicial inquiry into parole 
revocation is obviously limited by the very nature of 
the proceeding. The plenary authority of the Board of 
Pardons should not be disturbed in the absence of a 
dear abuse of its rightful discration. 
Hard/ 573 P.2d at 782 (emphasis added). 
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the Board's conclusions of law and application of the law to the 
facts. Crockett. 836 P.2d at 820. That is, the trial court should 
simply have reviewed the Board's Amended Findings of Fact and 
determined whether those findings met the elements of aggravated 
robbery. 
Even a perfunctory review of the findings show that they 
establish those elements. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990) defines 
aggravated robbery as the commission of a robbery during which the 
robber "uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon." Although the 
Board disregarded the eyewitness identification testimony of the 
Taco Bell employees, (R. 16-17) , the findings of fact establish, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that Walker was the perpetrator of 
a robbery and he used a gun to carry it out. These are the 
elements of an aggravated robbery and the Board's findings met each 
of them with constitutionally sufficient evidence. Therefore, the 
trial court should have accepted the Board's judgment and should 
have denied Walker's request for extraordinary relief. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
The Board respectfully requests that the Court vacate the 
trial court's order and remand to the trial court solely for entry 
of an order denying Walker's petition for extraordinary relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 3D ^  day of December 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
faith Li kjs^Jtkte 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
15 
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ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK 
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Provo, Utah 84606 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined 
in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be 
considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead 
Corporation 
77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by 
majority decision when and under what conditions, subject to this 
chapter and other laws of the state, persons committed to serve 
sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional 
facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment 
or as otherwise limited by law, may be released upon parole, 
pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, 
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or 
terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct 
hearings. The chair shall appoint members to the panels in any 
combination and in accordance with rules promulgated by the 
board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons. The 
chair may participate on any panel and when doing so is chair of 
the panel. The chair of the board may designate the chair for any 
other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or 
restitution remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted 
or sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the 
board or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any 
action taken under this subsection other than by a majority of 
the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a 
full hearing before the board. 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, 
rehearings, and parole revocation hearings, timely prior notice 
of the time and place of the hearing shall be given to the 
defendant, the county or district attorney's office responsible 
for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law 
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and 
conviction, and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's 
family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family 
shall include information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any 
related rules made by the board under that section. This 
information shall be provided in terms that are reasonable for 
the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole in cases 
involving paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of 
sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are 
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this 
section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil 
judgment. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or 
limitation of the governor's power to grant respite or reprieves 
in all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, 
except treason or conviction on impeachment. However, respites or 
reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue 
or terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the 
punishment, or pardon the offense as provided. In the case of 
conviction for treason, the governor may suspend execution of the 
sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its 
next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or commute 
the sentence, or direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions 
offenders serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have 
restitution ordered, or have their fines or forfeitures remitted, 
or their sentences commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons 
and Parole shall consider whether the persons have made or are 
prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with 
the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition 
of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or 
commutation or termination of sentence. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead 
Corporation 
ADDENDUM B 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
330 South 300 East, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THAYNE LARRY WALKER, 
ORDER 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
Case No. 930904964 HC 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al,, 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Respondents. : 
The above-entitled matter came before this court on November 
11, 1993 and January 24, 1994. Respondents were represented by 
Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, and Petitioner was 
present and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock. The court, 
having entered its ruling by minute entry on November 30, 1993, 
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Petitioner is lawfully imprisoned at the Utah State 
Prison for the crimes of robbery, a second degree felony and 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third 
degree felony. These sentences are running consecutively. 
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2. Petitioner's sentences of imprisonment will not expire 
until November 2010. 
3. On July 25, 1989, Petitioner was paroled from the 
prison by order of the Utah Board of Pardons. 
4. On February 25, 1993, Petitioner received a parole 
revocation hearing before the Board that was continued on March 
29, 1993; at which time, the Board heard testimony and received 
evidence on the allegations that Petitioner had violated his 
Parole Agreement. 
5. Subsequently, the Board found Petitioner guilty of 
violating his Parole Agreement by having committed the offense of 
aggravated robbery and by having failed to reside at his 
residence of record. 
6. The Board revoked Petitioner's parole date and ordered 
his re-incarceration at the prison based upon the violations. 
7. Written findings and conclusions were prepared by the 
Board detailing and explaining the Board's decision. 
8. Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
on or about September 2, 1993, challenging the actions of the 
Board in revoking his parole. 
9. An evidentiary hearing was held before this court on 
November 11, 1993. 
10. On November 30, 1993, this court issued a minute entry 
2 
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denying in part and granting in part, Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
11. Respondents' counsel, Lorenzo K. Miller, requested a 
hearing and clarification on the minute entry of November 30, 
1993. Accordingly, on January 24, 1994, the court clarified its 
minute entry. 
12. The court found, after examination of the transcripts, 
the court's file, and counsels' arguments, that there was 
insufficient and evidence before the Board to find that 
Petitioner committed the crime of aggravated robbery. 
13. Specifically, the court found that the affidavits and 
testimony from Toni Christensen and Linda Rice conflicted with 
the testimony at trial and based upon those conflicts, the Board 
had insufficient evidence to conclude Petitioner committed the 
offense of aggravated robbery. 
14. However, based on the uncontested admissions of 
Petitioner, the court found sufficient evidence for the Board to 
revoke Petitioner's parole based upon the violation of failing to 
reside at a residence of record. 
Having made the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the 
court orders the following: 
1. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
3 
2. Petitioner's requested relief is granted m part and 
denied in part. 
3. The Board shall reconsider Petitioner's case in light 
of the court's ruling-* and shall act accordingly. 
day of February, 1994. 
BY THKJSOmT: 
DATED t h i s 2K 
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Third District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid to David S. Steed. 
203 South 1920 West, Provo, UT 84601, this O day of February, 
1994. 
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Governor 
« < * • * R. S*W*tt 
Chairman 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Alleged AMENDED 
Parole Violation of FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
THAYNE LARRY WALKER CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
USP #13057 
nmODDCTIGN 
Thayne Larry Walker was charged with violating bis parole by (t) having 
failed to reside at a residence of record, and (2) having committed the 
offense of Aggravated Robbery. Mr. Walker pled guilty to the residence 
violation and not guilty to the allegation of Aggravated Robbery, and an 
Evidentiary Hearing was scheduled on this latter charge. 
Ou February 25f 1993. the matter came on for hearing before the Board of 
Pardons, and again on March 29, 1993. Board members sitting were Curtis L. 
Garner and Cheryl Hansen. Parolee Thayne Walker was present and represented 
by counsel Mark Stringer. The State was represented by Assistant Attorney 
General Ralph Adams. After hearing the evidence, the stipulations of the 
parties and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised herein, the 
Board now finds Thayne Larry Walker in violation of his parole by having 
failed to reside at a residence of record, and by having committed the offense 
of Aggravated Robbery, and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, which constitute the decision of the Board: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Thayne Larry Walker was paroled from the Utah State Prison on July 
25, 1989. 
2. On or about July 27, 1989, Thayne Larry Walker left his residence of 
record without notifying Adult Probation and Parole, and thereafter failed to 
notify Adult Probation and Parole of his residence. 
3a On or about August 16, 1989, Thayne Larry Walker asked Toni 
Christensen to get him a gun so that he could "make some money". 
4a On or about August 16, 1989, and in response to Mr* Walker's request, 
Toni Chriatensen rode with Mr. Walker and Mr. Walker's girlfriend, Linda Rice, 
to the home of Ms. Chrisleusen's father, in Murray, Utah- There she obtained 
her father's silver-colored revolver and gave it to Mr* Walker. THe three of 
them traveled to this location in Linda Rico's blue Toyota automobile. 
5. On or about August 18, 19U9, at approximately 9:30 p.m., a Taco Bell 
restaurant, located at 4199 South Redwood Road, Murray, Utah, was robbed. The 
robber, who was wearing a aki mask at the time, stood between 6V and 6*4" i n Q 0 0 l 5 
height, had blue eyea with wrinkles around them, light brown or sandy blond 
hair, and carried a silver-colored revolver. Be wore levis, tennis ahoei* and 
Members 
Donald L Btonchtrd 
H.L (Pt It) Haun 
Curtt* L Qarntr 
Cteryt Hantsn 
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6. During the robbery, the robber pointed hia gun at MB. Reid. Be told 
her not to try anything or he would kill her. He walked directly to the safe* 
removed the lid, and retrieved a money bag, which contained mostly loose 
change. He then motioned with his gun for Ha. Reid to walk to the cash 
register* She did so and gave him the money from the register. He took it, 
said "thank you," and ran from the restaurant out the back door. 
7. At the time of the robbery it was the ordinary practice of Taco Bell 
employees to place loose coins In rolls wrapped in lfTaco Bell11 paperf and then 
to place these in the safe. It is probable, but not certain, that auch rolls 
were in the Taco Bell eafe at the time of the robbery. 
8. Upon leaving the Taco Bell, the robber ran to a blue Toyota, Utah 
license plate number 719BDP, and entered the paaaenger side. The car then 
fled at a high rate of speed. 
9* On the date of the robberyf Utah license plate number 719DF was 
registered to a blue Toyota, owned by Thomas Bridwell. 
10. Thomas Bridwell is the brother of Linda Rice. 
11. Linda Rice was and is Thayne Larry Walker'a girlfriend. She 
regularly drove her brother's blue Toyota. 
12. Thayne Larry Walker resided with Linda Rice following his absconsion 
from parole supervision. 
13. From observation at the hearingt the Board notes that Thayne Larry 
Walker stands approximately 6'2" tall, has light brown or sandy blond hair, 
and blue eyes with wrinkles around them. 
14. At approximately 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. on August 18, 1989, Thayne Larry 
Walker appeared at the apartment of Shelly Manwell. He was carrying a 
moneybag which contained coin rolls wrapped In plastic with MTaco Bell11 on 
them. He also carried the gun which he had received from Toni Chriatenaen two 
days previous. He was wearing levis and tennis shoes. He was "wet", appeared 
nervousi entered the residence shortly thereafter and also appeared upset. 
She stated that ahe felt "they" had been eeent and that ahe had hidden her car. 
15* To the extent that the testimony of any witneaa ia not in accord 
with the findings herein, it is not credited. Any Conclusion of Law which 
should be deemed a Finding of Fact ia hereby adopted as auch. 
IV1DBNTIART DISCUSSION 
A. Eyewitness Identification 
. At the hearing, defense counsel made two motions in limine relating to 
State's evidence of eyewitness identification. 
First, the defense moved that the Board either recuse itself entirely in 
this matter, or in the alternative that it bifurcate the hearing to make a 
preliminary determination of the admissibility of eyewitness identification 
testimony, and that those Board members making this initial determination then 
recuse themselves from further aitting in this matter. Counsel cited State v. 
KflffiiTfifct 817 P. 2d 774, 780-784 (Utah 1991), for the propoeition that the 0 0 0 1 
distinction between judge and jury must be preserved when dealing with the 
foundation for eyewitness identification, and that the ultimate finder of fact 
must not paaa on queations of admissibility. This motion was denied. 
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Next the defense moved to dismiss all charges against Thayne Larry 
Walker• The motion was based on the argument that admission of eyewitness 
testimony impermissibly tainted under Ramirez would constitute a violation of 
due process, and that if such evidence were excluded, the State would have no 
case* This motion was also denied* 
During the hearing, and over defense objections, the Board allowed 
eyewitnesses to the robbery to identify Thayne Larry Walker as the robber. 
The Board permitted such testimony on the ground that (1) the tarnirez 
requirement of an independent determination as to admissibility applies to 
jury, not bench trials; and (2) parole revocation hearings are "informal" 
proceedings at which formal rules of evidence do not apply and in which any 
evidentiary problems normally go to weight, rather than admissibility. At the 
conclusion of the State's case, however* the Board determined that the 
eyewitness testimony was in fact impermissibly tainted by the witnesses' prior 
exposure, both live and photographic, to Mr* Walker. The Board therefore 
disregarded all evidence of eyewitness identification in reaching it's 
decision. 
B Transcript Testimony from Criminal Trial 
At the outset of the hearing, defense counsel alio made a motion in 
limine to suppress as hearsay all transcript testimony from Mr. Walkerfe 
criminal trial. Thia motion was denied. Later, during the hearing, the Board 
received into evidence transcripts of trial testimony by Toni Ohristensen over 
a renewed hearsay objection. This objection was overruled and the evidence 
was received based upon (1) the admissibility of hearsay in parole violation 
proceedings (Utah Admin. R. 671-508-(£))f and (2) the Board*6 finding that Ms. 
Christensen was unavailable as a witness (Utah R. Evid., 804). 
C. Credibility of Toni Christensen Hearsay Documents 
Following the admission of Toni Christensenfs trial testimony, the Board 
allowed the defense-to Introduce a notarised affidavit by Ms. Christensen in 
which she arguably contradicts her testimony at trial. In the affidavit, she 
states that she had used drugs and alcohol at some unspecified time prior to 
the trial, and that she testified as she did at the trial due to her fear of 
possible criminal prosecution. The affidavit does not specify in what manner, 
if any, her trial testimony was incorrect; rather, it merely states that she 
could no longer recall the events of August, 1989. 
A companion affidavit by attorney Robert Archuleta, as well as his 
testimony at the hearing, amplifies somewhat on the Toni Christensen 
affidavit. Mr. Archuleta states that Toni Christensen told him that ahe was a 
drug addict and was alcohol-intoxicated at the time of her trial testimony and 
that she testified as she did at trial because she was mad at Linda Rice, she 
feared criminal prosecution unless she cooperated, she feared losing her 
children to the State if she did not cooperate, and she expected some form of 
monetary compensation in exchange for her testimony. 
The Board finds Ms* Christensen?s affidavit testimony to be less reliable 
than that offered at trial. In making this determination, we consider a 
number of factors: 
First» the trial testimony was given in a courtroom setting where the 
witness's demeanor was on display and where she was subject to examination bv 
V^A.«~ 4.1^^ - - • . . . » 
Second, the trial testimony is clear, detailed, and comes directly from 
the mouth of the witness herself. The affidavit, by contrastt is brief, 
somewhat vague and was drafted for her by Mr. Walkerfs criminal attorney* 
Third, the trial testimony is consistent with an independent account 
given by Ms. Christensen to Murray Police Detective Glover. The affidavit is 
not. 
Fourth, the affidavit was not executed until approximately 24 months 
after the trial. 
Fifth, Toni Christensen was hostile toward Linda Rice (Mr. Walker's 
girlfriend) at the time of trial and was cross-examined concerning this. She 
was further cross-examined regarding her drug and alcohol use. By the time 
she met with Mr. Walker's attorney to prepare the affidavit, however, she had 
reconciled with Ms. Rice to the point that Ms. Rice was present with her at 
the time of the attorney** interview. Further, it was the impression of one 
of the attorneys in attendance that the women had been drinking together for 
an extended period* Thus a legitimate question arises whether Toni 
Christensen was pressured into making the affidavit in a moment of imparled 
judgment. Unfortunately, the State has had no opportunity to explore these 
-^possibilities with the witness on cross-examination. 
Baaed upon these considerations, insofar as the trial testimony and 
affidavit are in conflict, the Board finds the trial testimony more credible* 
D. Credibility of Linda Rice 
Defense witness Linda Rice testified at the hearing that she had no 
independent knowledge of the August 18th Robbery, or of who committed it. The 
Board finds this aspect of Ms. Rice's testimony lacking in credibility, based 
upon at least three considerations; 
First, Ms. Rice's demeanor at the hearing was unconvincing. During her 
testimony, she avoided eye contact with the Board, frequently appeared 
ion certain as to how to testify, and seemed uncomfortable, shifting frequently 
in her seat during cross-examination• Occasionally she would turn to look at 
Mr* Walker before answering State counsel's questions. 
Second, Ms* Rice has a motive to lie. She was herself originally charged 
criminally along with Mr. Walker, and she admits that she wants their romance 
to continue whenever he is released from prison* 
Third, at least some of her testimony is implausible, which casts a cloud 
of doubt upon the remainder* For example* her story that she never discussed 
Toni Christensen's prior testimony with her, nor what Mr* Christensen might 
say in a subsequent affidavit, strikes us as highly unlikely, given Ms* Rice's 
obvious interest and opportunity to discuss this* 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. Thayne Larry Walker*was lawfully paroled, 
2* Thayne Larry Walker was charged with violation of hit parole/ 0 0 0 1 8 
3. Thayne Larry Walker was afforded all of his Constitutional and 
Statutory rights and privileges. 
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4. The State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Larry Thayne Walker violated his parole* 
b. Thayne Larry Walker did in fact violate his parole by failing to 
reside at a residence of record and by committing the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery, the commission of the Robbery having been established at the 
Evidentiary Hearing herein. 
6. Either of said violations is individually sufficient, without the 
other, to revoke the Parole of Thayne Larry Walker. 
7. Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is 
hereby adopted as such. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parole granted Thayne Larry Walker on the 25th 
day of July, 1989, be and the same is hereby revoked. The matter will be 
shceduled for a Rehearing in September, 1996. 
2><f Aula*? 
Dated this 4»d-day of ApM*?' 1993. 
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FAX TRANSMISSION CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that on the 3rd day of August, 1993, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law was sent via fax transmission, pre-paid, to: 
1-375-0704: 
Mark Stringer 
Attorney at Law 
Cotton Tree Square, Suite 9-D 
2230 North University Avenue Parkway 
Provo, Utah 64604 
^sWsAta-s. 
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